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he Psychology of Good Character 
Alice Woolley1 and Jocelyn Stacey2 
I. Introduction 
Defying the improbability of time-travel, Dr. K, a forensic psychiatrist working in 
Toronto, Ontario in the 1990s, meets Justice H, the Chief Justice of British 
Columbia in the late 1940s.  They meet to discuss the possible admission to a 
law society of Mr. P, who in 1994 falsified his resume and transcripts in applying 
for an articling position.  In particular, they are there to determine whether Mr. P 
is of “good character”.  To begin the discussion each makes an opening 
statement about what they think is primarily relevant to determining the character 
of the applicant and his possible admission to the bar: 
Dr. K: “Behaviour flows from character.  In 1994, the applicant displayed 
bad behaviour from which an inference could be drawn about bad 
character.  In 1999, the applicant displayed good behaviour.  The 
question  [is] whether this was the result of a conscious decision on the 
part of the applicant to change his behaviour without an underlying change 
in character (in which case, his earlier behaviour was related to transient 
factors), or whether that good behaviour flowed from the applicant’s bad 
character as yet unchanged.”3 
Chief Justice H: “The law student's training is not manual training, but is 
training of the mind, not only in law, but if he wishes to be something more 
than a mere legal mechanic, he must study logic, history, in particular 
constitutional history, political science and economics, a certain amount of 
philosophy and acquire a reasonable familiarity with English literature, and 
know something at least of the literature of other countries.  The object 
of law training is to attract young men of high character, and to train them 
in a manner that they will be trustworthy, honourable and competent in the 
performance of their legal duties, and will use such influence as they have 
to maintain and improve but not destroy our Canadian constitutional 
democracy”4 
In reading this exchange one could reasonably enough wonder whether Dr. K 
and Chief Justice H will ever find common ground, or even be able to recognize 
each other as talking about the same thing.  Yet both these statements were 
made (though not made to each other) in the application of a common legal 
standard: whether an applicant for law society admission is of “good character”.   
This paper explores the significance of the changing nature of the good character 
requirement for law society admission.  It posits that good character has shifted 
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from a philosophical concept – a “cultural project”5 of professionalism – into a 
psychological concept, with evidence of past bad acts claimed to be relevant for 
whether an applicant represents a future risk to the public.6  We suggest, 
however, that this shifting conception of character has been only partial, and that 
the decision-making processes of Canadian law societies have not kept pace 
with it.  Instead, the decision-making process defines character generally and 
generically, with only occasional emphasis on character as a relevant predictor of 
future behaviour.  In addition, law societies only rarely employ psychological 
evidence7 in their decision-making processes, and when they do employ such 
evidence they seem uncertain as to its relevance and utility. 
Finally, this paper explores whether law societies should embrace a more overt 
recognition of character as a psychological concept.  Whether law societies 
should make determinations of character similarly to other legal contexts in which 
the relevant legal standard is psychological – what custody decision is in the 
“best interests” of the child and whether an offender is “dangerous.”  We review 
how psychological evidence is used in the context of determinations of custody 
and dangerousness, and the success (or, as it turns out, the failure) of 
psychological evidence as an aid to fair and accurate decision-making in those 
circumstances. In the end, the paper concludes that while treating good 
character as a psychological standard is the only way to make the requirement 
logical and justifiable in light of the purposes it is said to fulfill, the employment of 
a psychological standard is fraught with difficulty.  There is, in the end, no reason 
to believe that a psychology based approach will lead to more coherent and fair 
decision-making.  Given that, and given the significant issues with a non-
psychological concept of character, the case for retaining a good character 
requirement for bar admission is weak.  
II. The Changing Conception of Character 
The requirement that Canadian lawyers be of “good character” has existed since 
the advent of any formal regulation of the profession.  For example, the first legal 
standards for those seeking to act as lawyers within the North-West Territories 
were established in December 1885 by the Lieutenant-Governor.  Other than 
lawyers who were already admitted to the bar or had practiced in another of the 
“Queen’s Dominions,” anyone seeking enrollment as an advocate had to be of 
“good character”.  In 1888 these rules were expanded to require anyone seeking 
enrollment as an advocate (whether admitted elsewhere or not) to establish his 
                                         
5W. Wesley Pue, “Cultural Projects and Structural Transformation in the Canadian Legal Profession” in Lawyers and 
Vampires (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) at * (hereinafter “Cultural Projects”). 
6 The test for good character is, of course, one of present good character.  However, the trigger for a good character 
hearing is always a past bad act.  
7 The term “psychological evidence” will be used to describe both psychological and psychiatric evidence throughout this 
paper.  We recognize that the terms are scientifically distinct, but note that for the purpose of this paper the way in which 
the courts use both types of evidence is essentially identical. 
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good character.8  When the Law Society of Alberta was created in 1907, “A letter 
of good character was the entrance fee.”9 
The good character requirement continues to apply to admission to provincial law 
societies of all prospective Canadian lawyers.  All applicants must provide some 
documentation in support of their good character (letters of reference) and, as 
well, must disclose information related to past “bad acts” which might, in the law 
societies’ view, be indicative of bad character.10   
Is today’s good character requirement oriented at fundamentally the same thing 
as that which concerned the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Territories in 
1888 when he required that all those seeking enrollment be of good character? 
Answering this question requires identifying what good character would have 
meant in that earlier time frame: what, for example, would the original 144 
members of the Law Society of Alberta in 1907 have understood to be 
encompassed by the requirement that they provide a letter of good character as 
the price of admission?  What would a subsequent bencher of the Law Society of 
Alberta have felt was important in determining whether an applicant for 
admission was of good character? 
Answering these questions is challenging.  The only published Canadian good 
character decisions prior to 1989 are a 1922 decision in which the British 
Columbia Superior Court held that it had no jurisdiction to review whether or not 
sufficient proof of good character was provided,11 and the previously cited Martin 
decision in which the British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed the Law Society’s 
refusal to admit an applicant with communist beliefs. Some assessment can be 
made, however, by drawing on W. Wesley Pue’s extensive analysis of this early 
period of Canadian legal professionalism, including the use of character as part 
of the establishment of lawyers’ professional identity.  Pue argues that the 
creation of the structures of lawyer professionalism in Canada was a deliberate 
act, a response by lawyers to cultural and social conditions, to their sense of 
Canada (especially western Canada) as a fundamentally egalitarian society, but 
also one threatened by disruptive forces of social change and radicalism.  To 
those lawyers, professionalism, especially professionalism as it was developing 
in the United States, was “a social vision which held forth the promise of founding 
a better world on terrain mid-way between the Bolshevik abyss and a sort of 
ancien regime repression.”12 
                                         
8 Louis Knafla, “Frontier Lawyers: Origins of the Alberta Law, 1882-1914” in Law Society of Alberta, Just Works: Lawyers 
in Alberta 1907-2007 (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 17-18. 
9 Ibid.  at 22. 
10 See Alice Woolley, “Tending the Bar: The ‘Good Character’ Requirement for Law Society Admission” (2007) 30 Dal. L.J. 
27 at 31-35 for a summary of how the good character requirement is administered in the various provinces.  
11 Hagel v. Law Society of British Columbia [1922] 31 B.C.R. 75 
12 “Cultural Projects” note 5 supra at *.  See also, W. Wesley Pue, “In Pursuit of a Better Myth” (1995) 33 Alta. L.R. 730; 
W. Wesley Pue, “Becoming 'Ethical': Lawyers' Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century Canada” (1991) 20 
Manitoba Law Journal, 227-261; W. Wesley Pue, “British masculinities, Canadian Lawyers: Canadian legal education, 
1900-1930", in Misplaced Traditions: The Legal Profession and the British Empire, Symposium Issue, 16(1) Law in 
Context, 1999 (guest edited by Robert McQueen and W. Wesley Pue), 80-122.  
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Professionalism in this sense had three components: ensuring a particular form 
of lawyer education, one directed towards creating a better kind of person; 
establishing admission standards that would ensure that the right kind of people 
became lawyers; setting standards of lawyer behaviour and disciplining those 
lawyers who broached them.  Through all three components ran a common 
thread: the emphasis was never on technical competence, it was on the type of 
person the lawyer was.  As indicated by the quotation from Martin, legal 
education was designed to take men of “high character” and to develop them into 
individuals who were “trustworthy, honourable and competent”.  Admission was 
also oriented towards the type of person the lawyer would be, focused on 
“centrally important questions regarding what sort of person from what sort of 
background could properly embody law in a new British dominion”.13  And finally, 
discipline and conduct was oriented in part at behaviours which were 
undesirable, but more fundamentally at ridding the profession of bad people.  As 
dramatically expressed by Sir James Aikins, President of the Canadian Bar 
Association, “If the legal profession refuses to ruthlessly rid itself of its barnacles 
and fungus, how can the public be expected to extend to the profession, as a 
profession, the high honor, the dignity and revenue which that profession rightly 
deserves”.14 
When viewed in this context it seems likely that a lawyer in 1920, when asked 
what good character is, and how you know whether it is present or absent, would 
have drawn some connection between bad acts and bad character, and between 
good acts and good character.  But that connection would not have been an 
exercise in psychological prediction.  Sir James Aikins would not have viewed 
bad conduct as empirically or probabilistically relevant to whether the person 
engaging in that conduct was at heightened risk of behaving badly in the future 
(although he probably would have thought it quite likely); he would have viewed 
bad conduct as evidence of a bad nature, indicating a person as fundamentally 
unworthy of admittance to the profession.  Moreover, as evidenced by the 
historical association in the United States of the good character requirement with 
denial of admission to whole groups of people, including women and minorities,15 
there was a perception of good character arguably entirely unrelated to how one 
had lived one’s life in a particular sense.  Character was generic, general and 
related to the essential “truth” of a man, rather than to any particular acts he had 
committed (or might commit in the future). 
                                         
13 Cultural Projects note 5, supra at * 
14 Ibid.  at * 
15 Deborah Rhode, “Moral Character as a Professional Credential” (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 491 at 499.  The good character 
requirement does not appear to have a similar history in Canada, presumably because the existence of an articling 
requirement allowed for informal forms of social exclusion (Rhode notes that when there was an apprenticeship system 
this was the primary means of social exclusion).  The Ontario legislature passed a special bill allowing the enrollment in 
the Law Society of Upper Canada of a Black man, Delos Rogest Davis, after was unable to obtain art icles.  Famously, in 
1937 Bora Laskin, the first Jewish member of the Supreme Court of Canada and ultimately Chief Justice, was unable to 
find a job after graduating from Harvard Law School and upon returning to Toronto: “the brilliant legal scholar with two 
master’s degrees had to write headnotes for a law publisher at fifty cents a note’”.  It was not until 1960 that a Black 
woman was admitted to the Law Society of Upper Canada and not until 1976 that the first First Nations woman would 
“graduate from law.”  Constance Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth-Century Canada 
(Toronto: The Osgoode Society 1991) at 300 (re Davis), 324 (re Laskin) and 326 (re late admissions).  
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This summary of the historical conception of character is supported by Kronman, 
whose idea of the “lawyer-statesman” invokes the historical relationship between 
the lawyer-statesman and character: 
By character I mean, broadly speaking, an ensemble of settled 
dispositions – of habitual feelings and desires. To have character of 
a certain sort is to possess a set of such dispositions that is 
identifiable and distinct  being  more calm or cautious than most 
people and better able to sympathize with a wide range of 
conflicting points of view  the trait of prudence or practical 
wisdom calmness in his deliberations, together with a balanced 
sympathy  the lawyer-statesman’s professional standing is as 
much to be explained by who he is as what he knows. 
The ideal of the lawyer statesman was an ideal of character.16 
How does that vision of character relate to the modern application of the 
requirement?  There is much more information about the understanding of the 
good character requirement today, with law society decisions, guidelines, stated 
purposes, and a governing definition.17  Based on that information, it appears that 
the current understanding of the meaning and significance of good character is 
somewhat confused.  On the one hand, the justification for the requirement 
relates fundamentally to protection of the public; it is through character screening 
that the “high ethical standards” of the profession will be maintained.18  Character 
is viewed as the “well spring of professional conduct in lawyers,”19 and the 
general test for determining character is oriented towards indicating whether the 
past misconduct indicates an absence of current good character. The applicant 
must demonstrate that he or she is currently of good character taking into 
account: 
a. the nature and duration of the [prior] misconduct; b. whether the 
applicant is remorseful; c. what rehabilitative efforts, if any, have 
been taken, and the success of such efforts; d. the applicant’s 
conduct since the proven misconduct.20 
On the other hand, the definition for character adopted by the law societies is 
highly generic and general: 
 
                                         
16 Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993) at 15-16.  In this quote Kronman is talking about the lawyer-statesman as the nineteenth century lawyers would 
have conceived it.  See also: W. Wesley Pue, “Educating the Total Jurist”, (2006) 8 Journal of Legal Ethics, 208.  
17 For a general review and critique of the good character requirement’s current application in Canada see Woolley note 
10,  
18 Re Rajnauth and Law Society of Upper Canada (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 381 at 384. 
19 Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline, looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2007 at 23-3. 
20 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Birman, 2005 ONLHP 6, [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 13 at para. 6. 
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Character is that combination of qualities or features distinguishing 
one person from another.  Good character connotes moral or 
ethical strength, distinguishable as an amalgam of virtuous or 
socially acceptable attributes or traits which undoubtedly include, 
among others, integrity, candour, empathy, and honesty.21 
It may be that this definition – with its emphasis on “socially acceptable attributes 
and traits,” and its reference to “integrity, candour, empathy, and honesty” as 
examples of those traits – is more psychologically rooted, and also distinct from 
the description of character in Martin, with its emphasis on moral development 
and virtues such as “honour”.  However, the definition is a far cry from a standard 
psychologist definition of character: 
 
The enduring, patterned functioning of an individual.  As perceived 
by others, it is the person’s habitual way of thinking, feeling, and 
acting.  Understood psychodynamically, character is the person’s 
habitual mode of reconciling intrapsychic conflicts.  Character 
stands beside, but may be differentiated from, other terms for 
global aspects of personality, such as identity, self, and ego.22 
Further, in several cases the Law Society of Upper Canada has strongly rejected 
any suggestion that an applicant must demonstrate that she is a low risk to the 
public in the future.23  In addition, there are only two reported cases in which 
significant weight was placed on psychological evidence with respect to the 
applicant.24  In most cases no psychological evidence is introduced, and no 
significance is given to that fact by the decision-maker.25   
This suggests some uncertainty in the current approach to good character.  
Decision-makers appear (largely) to recognize that, in the modern era, restricting 
the profession to those who meet some vaguely articulated notion of ethical 
character is not justifiable.  At the same time, however, decision-makers have not 
embraced a fully psychological concept of character. The generic definition of 
character, the adamant refusal to focus attention on the likelihood of misconduct 
                                         
21 Re P (DM), [1989] O.J. No. 1574 at 22 (QL) Please note that page references to this case are based on a 10-pt Times 
New Roman PDF downloaded from Quicklaw. 
22 W.W. Meissner, The Ethical Dimension of Psychoanalysis: A Dialogue (New York: SUNY Press, 2003) at 267, citing 
Moore and Fine.  Meissner notes that this definition “circumvents any ethical connotations, as when we speak of someone 
as a person or character, or allude to someone’s good or bad character.  Character in the latter sense refers more directly 
to characteristic ethical qualities and dispositions, virtues, vices, and values that persist in the indivdual’s patterns of 
thought, feeling, and action”.  This distinction between ethical and psychological character is discussed in more detail 
below. 
23 In the Matter of an Application for Admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada by Joseph Rizzotto, Reasons of 
Convocation, September 14, 1992 at para. 32 and also Preyra v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2003] L.S.D.D no. 25 
(QL) [Preyra #2].   
24 Re P, note 21 supra; Preyra #1 note 3, supra (and also Preyra #2).  In two cases the panel took note of the fact that the 
applicant had had psychological counselling – Miller v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 ONLSHP 4 and Law Society 
of Upper Canada v. Birman 2006 ONLSHP 32 – and in one case the panel noted that it would have been helpful to have 
had the assistance of psychological evidence – Burgess v. Law Society of Upper Canada 2006 ONLSHP 66. 
25 Rizzotto, note 23, supra; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Schuchert, [2001] L.S.D.D. No. 63 (QL); Law Society of 
Upper Canada v. D’Souza [2002] L.S.D.D. No. 62; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Levesque [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 38 
(QL); In the Matter of an Application by Michael John Spicer for Admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada, Reasons 
of Convocation, May 1, 1994; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Shore 2006 ONLSHP 55. 
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in the future, and the lack of reliance on psychological evidence about the 
character of the applicant, suggest that law societies still view character as at 
least in part ethical or cultural, rather than strictly psychological.  That is, the law 
societies do not talk in terms of an ethical conception of character, but the way in 
which they search for character amounts, in most cases, most of the time, to a 
search for ethical character. 
Why does this matter?  What is the difference between ethical and psychological 
character, and why might the law societies’ continued regulation of ethical, as 
opposed to psychological, character be problematic?   
The differences between ethical and psychological character can perhaps be 
best explained through articulating a distinction between the ethical concept of 
“character” and the psychological concept of “personality”.26  “Character” is, in 
essence, derived from the Aristotelian philosophy of virtue ethics, in which the 
combination of an individual’s possession of virtues with the exercise of practical 
judgment will shape her decisions and result (ultimately) in Eudaimonia 
(flourishing).27  It necessarily involves moral distinction, identification of aspects 
of character as good (virtues) or bad (vices).  Character as understood by virtue 
ethics may be subject to the critique of empirical invalidity,28 but its orientation 
fundamentally is not empirical or predictive; it is normative and philosophical. 29  
Further, the traits of character may be understood as likely to result in behaviour 
consistent with those traits (honesty with truth telling, for example) but the 
correlation is not strong, if for no other reason than that virtue ethics understands 
behaviour as a combination of the aspects of a person’s character and her 
exercise of practical judgment; conduct does not flow from character alone.  A 
person who lies may or may not have the virtue of honesty; it depends what other 
virtues were implicated by the situation, and how the individual assessed what 
the facts required. 
Personality, by contrast, is a concept of behavioural psychology, a discipline that 
expressly rejects the relevance of character: 
Gordon Allport, the main personality trait theorist in 20th century 
United States psychology, explicitly banished the term character 
from academic discourse concerning personality.  He argued that 
character was the subject matter of philosophy not psychology.  
The traits he urged psychologists to study were presumably 
objective entities (Allport dubbed them neuropsychic structures) 
                                         
26 The distinction between character and personality is one used in the academic literature.  For example, to explain the 
concept of ethical character, Christine McKinnon does so through distinguishing it from the concept of personality.  Some 
of the points made here, for example with respect to the moral neutrality of personality traits, are also made by McKinnon.  
Chstine McKinnon, Character, Virtue Theories and the Vices (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999) at 59-61.  See also: 
Ross Stagner, Psychology of Personality 3d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1961).   Although it also 
should be noted as is clear from the Meissner quotation (at note 22, supra) there is some inconsistency in this usage.   
27 McKinnon, ibid. at 61. 
28 And has been extensively critiqued on this basis by John Doris and others. 
29 “Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation  
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stripped of moral significance and linked to “adjustment” but not 
imbued with inherent value.30 
Personality constitutes, loosely, the empirically identified and measured 
dispositions of individuals, dispositions identified through assessment of 
individual behaviour, how individuals are perceived by others, and how 
individuals perceive themselves.31  There are five general “factors” of personality 
that will have links to behaviour: “I: Extraversion/introversion (or Surgency); II: 
Friendliness/hostility (or Agreeableness); III: Conscientiousness (or Will); IV: 
Neuroticism/emotional stability (or Emotional Stability); and V: Intellect (or 
Openness).”32 There is no necessary moral judgment associated with the 
possession of one personality trait over another,33 and the relevance of 
personality traits is their correlation to certain patterns of conduct – patterns of 
conduct indicate personality,34 and personality is predictive of patterns of 
conduct.35   
Given that distinction, why is regulation of ethical character not justified?  In brief, 
because it is non-empirical and because it potentially incorporates values that a 
modern lawyer should not be required to embrace as a condition of bar 
admission.   
Character in the general ethical sense has no empirically demonstrated 
relevance to future conduct.36  As John Doris and others have cogently argued, 
the overwhelming evidence of social psychology is that character writ large is 
non-predictive of conduct.37  There may be temporal stability of behaviour, and 
locally identifiable character traits that can be linked to conduct, but general 
ethical character has little empirical validity as a predictor of future conduct, 
whatever its philosophical merit.  Moreover, in analyzing behaviour in a particular 
situation, the general approach of virtue ethics has only marginal ability to relate 
particular behaviours to an individual’s possession (or not) or character.  For 
example, one virtue ethicist defending virtue ethics from the critique of social 
                                         
30 Citations omitted. Christopher Peterson and Martin E.P. Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and 
Classification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 55.  For some articles indicating the emersion of personality as a 
distinct concept from character, see: J.R. Kantor, “Character and Personality: Their Nature and Interrelations” (1938) 6 
Journal of Personality 306; William McDougall “Of the Words Character and Personality” (1932) 1 Journal of Personality  
3. 
31 Various studies measuring character are discussed in John M. Digman, “Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-
Factor Model” (1990)  41 Ann. Rev. of Psychol. 417 at 418-422. 
32 Ibid.  at 420. 
33 Note 30, supra and McKinnon note 26 at 61: “We judge character along ethical dimensions  Preferences among 
personality-types are much more context-sensitive and have much less to do with ethical considerations than do 
judgments about character”. 
34 Icek Ajzen, Attitudes, Personality and Behavior (2d ed.) (2005) (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 2005) at 2. 
35 “it is assumed by all trait theorists (despite their critics) that personality traits, however assessed have their links to 
behavior, a basic level is the specific response to a specific situation” Digman, ibid. at 424.  The correlation between 
assessed personality and future conduct is imperfect.  Digman discusses a study in which teachers assessed one 
measure of student personality in elementary and intermediate grades; the correlation with high school grade point 
average was 0.70.  Digman at 435-436.  Digman argues that situational psychologists ignored the evidence on correlation 
between personality and behaviour which existed prior to the various famous social psychology experiments such as 
Milgram’s, and ignored the fact that “situational variables usually failed to account for more than 15% of criterion variance” 
[in behavioural experiments].  Digman at 421. 
36 The social psychology critique of virtue ethics is discussed in Woolley note 17 at 63-65. 
37 John M. Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics” (1998) 32:4 Noûs 504. 
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psychology, and in particular from the argument that the Milgram experiment 
showed the significance of situations over character, suggested: 
Admittedly, Milgrams’s experiments show that a remarkable 
number of subjects administer electric shocks of considerable 
severity, in experimental situations of a certain type.  The tendency 
to perform beneficient acts is arguably not as robust as one might 
hope.  However, there was considerable variation in the mental 
states of those prepared to administer such shocks, and those 
differences may point to character traits of, for example, 
compassion, benevolence, respect for authority and commitments, 
which manifest themselves in various ways in dilemmatic 
situations.38 
This observation may be descriptively valid from the vantage point of virtue 
ethics, but it does not do much work, empirically speaking, for explaining the 
character of the individuals in the experiment. 
This lack of empirical foundation tends to lead to the result, documented 
elsewhere,39 that law society determinations of character tend to rest largely on 
decision-makers’ impressionistic assessment of an applicant as a witness.  
Decision-makers cannot draw satisfactory conclusions of character from past bad 
acts, they do not have any psychological evidence in most cases, and they have 
declined to engage in any type of predictive exercise as to the actual risk posed 
by this applicant.  As a consequence, the decisions end up turning on whether 
the applicant provides evidence which is “unsatisfactory”40 or lacking in 
“candour,”41 whether the applicant “displays a certain caginess bordering on 
arrogance”42 or by contrast is not “wishy-washy,”43 provides self-reporting that is 
“full and frank”44 or speaks “clearly, eloquently and without qualification state[s] 
that her actions were wrong.”45 
                                         
38 Christine Swanton, “Virtue Ethics” International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences at 16222.  To be 
fair, these comments are talking about different individuals doing a particular act, and what could be said about their 
character as a result of the choice they made.  It is fair to conclude that it would be difficult to say much about any one 
person from that type of data, whether viewing it through personality or through character.  The quotation shows, though, 
that from a philosophical/virtue point of view, linking behaviour to “character” is almost impossibly difficult.  This may be 
because virtue ethicists do not just have to link behaviour to the way a person is, they also have to link behaviour to a 
moral judgment about the way that a person is.  So, here, Swanton has to characterize the behaviour in some moral way 
– “cruelty” or “obedience” – and then identify the relevant virtue which the behaviour may reflect.  This is far more 
complicated than simply observing behaviour and observing the types of personality that may flow from it/cause it.  In 
addition, the extensive research into personality and behaviour can be relied upon.  The five factors are identified because 
over the course of behavioural research it is apparent that these are the five areas of relevant human variation.  They are 
the traits people have, in one way or another, and that in combination are significantly predictive of human conduct.  See 
Digman note 31, supra. 
39 See Woolley note 17, supra at 48-53, where she notes various grounds which would allow a reader to predict the result 
in the good character decisions, and the failure of any of the grounds to do so except the panel’s impression of the 
witness. 
40 D’Souza, supra note 25 at para. 42. 
41 Re P(DM) note 21 supra at 5. 
42 Rizzotto supra note 23. 
43 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Levesque [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 38 (QL) at para. 23. 
44 Schuchert note 25, supra at para. 21. 
45 Shore supra note 25 at para. 50. 
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This result seems facially unfair.  A prospective applicant is denied admission not 
because she poses any empirically demonstrable threat to the public, or presents 
an increased risk of not maintaining the high ethical standards of the profession, 
but rather because she doesn’t fit within some inchoate, vague idea of the right 
type of lawyer.  She is being denied admission because the decision-makers do 
not feel she has the right stuff to be a lawyer-statesman. 
This leads to the second issue with ethical character as a basis of regulation – its 
potential incorporation of contested values such as honour, integrity and civility.46  
While the 144 original members of the Law Society of Alberta may have been in 
agreement as to the relevance and significance of those “virtues,” and while 
some modern commentators such as Kronman may endorse their continued 
importance, they cannot validly constitute a universal requirement for law society 
admission.  Moreover, because the definition of “character” endorsed by the law 
societies is so general, and includes anything going to “moral or ethical strength,” 
there is no reason to be confident that decision-makers will limit the admission 
requirements to those virtues of character broadly accepted as relevant to the 
ethics of lawyering. 
In sum, to the extent the current approach to good character is consistent with its 
historical antecedents it is impossible to justify.  It denies an applicant admission 
to the law society for what amounts to not much of a reason at all, certainly not a 
reason based on any empirically plausible assertion regarding the particular 
applicant.  At the same time, however, those antecedents appear to have 
prevented the full evolution of the good character requirement into an empirically 
grounded notion of character, in which character is viewed as something relevant 
to whether a particular applicant, in fact, poses a risk with which the law society 
is justifiably concerned.  Good character is, as currently approached in Canada, 
neither wholly “ethical” and philosophical, nor wholly “psychological” and 
empirical.   
Assuming that regulation of ethical character is not justifiable, the remainder of 
this paper considers whether it is possible for the law society to develop the good 
character requirement into an empirical measure of the risk a particular applicant 
poses to the public.  Specifically, does identification of a self-consciously 
psychologically oriented determination of whether an applicant has personality 
traits or flaws which, in the circumstances of legal practice, pose a threat to the 
public or to the maintenance of ethical standards, present a viable regulatory 
option for law societies?  Can character be psychologized?  
The following section considers this question in three parts: 1) how successful 
have law societies been in employing psychological evidence in those cases 
where they have done so? 2) how have the courts used psychological evidence 
in contexts where a psychological standard is legally imposed – determinations 
of the “best interests” of a child in a custody dispute and of an offender’s 
                                         
46 For a critique of civility see: Alice Woolley, “Does Civility Matter” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 175.  
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“dangerousness?” and 3) does psychological evidence work – can psychologists 
make valid empirical predictions of future behaviour from current facts?   
III. Using Psychological Evidence 
A. Psychological Evidence in Good Character Proceedings 
As noted, the good character hearings have not widely embraced the use of 
psychological evidence in assessing character.  Only two of the published good 
character proceedings include the introduction and consideration of significant 
psychological evidence with respect to the applicants.  This section will outline 
those two cases to demonstrate how, even though psychological evidence was 
introduced, the panels were fundamentally uncertain about how to use it.  In 
neither of the decisions did the panel direct its consideration of that evidence to 
the question of whether, if the applicant became a lawyer, he posed a particular 
threat to the protection of the public, or to the maintenance of ethical standards. 
The first case, Re P(DM) considered the application for admission of DMP, who 
had been convicted of offences related to pedophilic sexual assault.47  One of the 
children was a profoundly deaf girl whom DMP met while working as a school 
bus driver.  He had a sexual relationship with the girl from the time she was nine 
years old until she was sixteen.  The second child was his biological daughter, 
with whom he had sexual relations from the time she was four until she was 
seven.  DMP pled guilty to sexual assault and having sexual relations with a 
minor, and was sentenced to eight months in jail and three years of probation.  
The justification for this relatively light sentence was, in the judge’s view, to give 
DMP an opportunity to turn his life around and to succeed in law school.48  DMP 
did attend law school, obtained and completed articles and applied for admission 
to the Law Society of Upper Canada. 
His application was rejected on the basis that he was not of good character.  A 
central issue for the panel was whether DMP was rehabilitated.  The panel found 
that when he committed the crimes DMP was clearly not of good character; the 
question was whether, in the intervening five years, his character has “so 
changed that he can now be said to be of good character”.49  To answer this 
question the panel considered a variety of psychological evidence.  They 
received reports from his treating psychologist, and from five other psychologists, 
most of whom had not met DMP, but had read the prepared reports and records.  
The conclusion of DMP’s treating psychologist was that DMP was a “functional” 
pedophile not a “core” pedophile, he was someone who had sex with children 
because he had an inability to form relationships with adult women.  In the first 
instance the treating psychologist was of the view that DMP would require 
significant therapy to develop his ability to form better relationships with adult 
women.  However, less than a year later the treating psychologist was of the 
view that DMP was cured.  He did not provide an explanation for this change in 
his opinion.  The other psychologists who provided evidence to the panel 
                                         
47 For a more fulsome discussion of this decision see Woolley note 17, supra at 40-41 and 72. 
48 Re P(DM) note 21, supra at 11. 
49 Re P(DM) note 21, supra at 24. 
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disagreed with the treating psychologist on his prognosis, noting that the 
absence of evidence that DMP could form relations with adult women suggested 
that he was still at risk to re-offend.  In addition, at least one report suggested 
that treating psychologists tend to lose the ability to judge their own patients with 
accuracy.  The panel accepted the evidence of these other psychologists, and 
rejected that of the treating psychologist.  They concluded that there “is no 
objective basis for the conclusion that Mr. P has been cured of his pedophilia.”   
While the panel appears to have been careful and thoughtful in its consideration 
of how to balance this evidence, the use which it makes of the evidence is 
somewhat puzzling.  Should the question not be whether, given the psychological 
evidence, DMP posed a risk to the public if he was admitted to the bar?  The 
general question of whether he was likely to be a recidivist is dealt with 
elsewhere in the legal system, in the original criminal sanction and in the 
opportunity for offenders to be labeled as “dangerous” and subject to an 
indefinite term of incarceration.  The judge in the criminal case did not appear 
especially concerned with the recidivism problem, stating that “I think there is a 
good prospect for you”.50  Further, it is not clear that being a lawyer would have 
heightened DMP’s likelihood of re-offending; lawyers are probably less likely than 
many people to encounter children in their daily work lives.  The most plausible 
explanation is that while this decision uses psychological evidence, it does not do 
so because of a psychological explanation of the importance of character – as a 
predictor of behaviour as a lawyer.  It uses psychological evidence to bolster 
what is essentially an ethical view of character: since DMP did these horrific acts, 
and the possibility of him doing them again cannot be ruled out, he is, in general, 
a man of bad character who ought not to be admitted to the profession. 
The other matter to include extensive psychological evidence was Re Preyra, in 
which the Law Society of Upper Canada twice heard the application for 
admission of Preyra, who falsified his resume and transcripts in applying for 
articles.  Preyra was denied admission after the first hearing in 2000, and 
admitted after the second hearing in 2003.  In both hearings extensive 
psychological evidence was presented.  In the first hearing there were five 
medical reports prepared by three doctors (two psychologists and one 
psychiatrist).  Preyra completed psychological testing, although the testing was 
not done under appropriate conditions, and one of the doctors reported that 
Preyra had “tried to best the test in an unsophisticated way”.51  Although Preyra’s 
treating psychologist was of the view that Preyra had been successfully treated 
through a course of “brief dynamic psychotherapy,” that doctor also testified that 
in his view many people padded their resumes.  One of the other doctors (Dr. 
Klassen, quoted at the outset of this paper) reported that while Preyra was not 
mentally ill, he was “very angry” and suffered from “grandiosity, a sense of being 
special or unique, with a need for admiration and, perhaps most significantly, a 
                                         
50 Ibid.  at 11. 
51 Preyra #1 at para. 36. 
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sense of entitlement”.52  Dr. Klassen expressed doubt as to whether Preyra had 
in fact been treated successfully. 
In deciding not to admit Preyra after that hearing, the panel did not expressly 
refer to the psychological evidence.  The only comment it made on the evidence 
was to disagree with the treating psychologists’ assessment that padding a 
resume was not a significant matter. 
In the second hearing more psychological evidence was introduced.  A new 
psychiatrist, who had treated Preyra for the prior three years, testified, and Dr. 
Klassen was also asked by the Law Society to re-assess Preyra.  Preyra again 
underwent psychological testing.  The treating psychiatrist’s evidence was 
positive, and Dr. Klassen’s assessment was also more positive. Preyra showed 
improved functioning on the psychological testing.  In reaching the decision to 
admit Preyra, the panel noted the favourable psychological evidence and 
appeared to rely on it, although the panel was obviously uncertain as to how to 
incorporate the evidence given the stated irrelevance of predictions of future 
conduct: 
 
Good character is determined at the date of the hearing.  Both 
section 27 and the case law under this section are clear that no 
speculation as to Mr. Preyra’s future behaviour is permitted.  It is 
presumably for this reason that restrictions or conditions cannot be 
placed on the admission of a member.  Despite that, Dr. Klassen 
testified that he could not predict Mr. Preyra’s future behaviour, Mr. 
Preyra is not required to demonstrate that the risk of future 
dishonesty is unlikely or non-existent.  It is necessary, however, to 
ensure that, on a balance of probabilities, Mr. Preyra’s change from 
bad character to good character is bona fide.53 
I would seem, then, that even in the cases where psychological evidence is used, 
decision-makers have not been able to incorporate that evidence into an 
empirical fact-based consideration of the likelihood that a particular applicant 
poses an increased risk to the public.  The emphasis, even here, is on the ethical 
aspect of character. 
In approaching the question this way, the decisions contrast strongly to other 
legal areas where courts are required to make psychological type determinations, 
and in which extensive use is made of psychological evidence to allow the court 
to do so. 
B. The Use of Psychological Evidence 
The use of psychological evidence in Canadian courts is prolific.  One author 
estimates that such evidence is introduced in over 100,000 cases a year.54  This 
                                         
52 Preyra #1 at para. 29. 
53 Preyra #2 at para. 99. 
54 Ron Nichwolodoff, “Expert Psychological Opinion Evidence in the Courts” (1998) 6 Health L.J. 279 at para. 2.  
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section focuses on two contexts where psychological evidence is used to support 
judges in making decisions regarding future behaviour: child custody hearings – 
i.e., the application of the “best-interests of the child” test – and in dangerous 
offender proceedings.  The legal tests to be applied by judges in these areas are 
general and only vaguely defined: “what is in the best interests of the child?” “Is 
this individual dangerous”?  As a consequence, courts seek to rely upon 
psychological evidence to make decisions about what constitutes the best 
decision going forward, to resolve the uncertainty of applying such a broad test to 
uncertain facts.  This section briefly overviews the nature of the court’s reliance 
upon psychological evidence in these contexts. 
1. Child Custody 
The legal test for custody in Canada is the “best interests of the child.”55  Custody 
disputes arise between parents, and between parents and the state (where a 
child has been apprehended).  In determining custody in either case the court 
has to answer questions – “Who is a better parent?” and “What situation is in the 
best interests of the child?” – the answers to which are psychological, not legal.  
In addition, the answers are prospective and predictive; they turn on what will be, 
not on what was.  The best interests test has been subject to ruthless criticism on 
the grounds of indeterminacy, and in particular the absence of legal guidance 
and the potential for infusion of a judge’s personal biases.56  To address these 
concerns legislation gives judges a laundry list of factors to consider in awarding 
custody.57  Yet these factors are still undefined, and the different factors are not 
placed in priority, leaving them substantially subjective such that the problem of 
indeterminacy persists.58 
It is the legal void created by the psychological nature of the questions, the 
problem of prediction, and of general indeterminacy, that forces judges to rely on 
psychological evidence.59 Some form of psychological evidence is presented in 
virtually every child custody hearing, and is relied upon by the court in some 
manner. 
The evidence is used in a variety of ways.  These include assisting the court in 
understanding, for example, the significance of psychological issues faced by a 
parent, the likely impact of a custody decision on a child, and the appropriate 
balance of factors relevant to the court’s determination.  For our purposes, 
however, the key observation is that courts rely on a psychologist to 
independently assess a parent to determine whether being with that parent is in 
                                         
55 See, for example, Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5 at s. 18(1). 
56 Bernd Walter, Janine Alison Isenegger and Hicholas Bala, “’Best Interests’ in Child Protection Proceedings: Implications 
and Alternatives” (1995) 12 Can. J. Fam. Law at para. 17; T.J. Hester, “The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Child 
Custody Determinations Incident to Divorce” (1992) 14 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 109 at 109; Daniel W. Shuman, “What 
Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About ‘The Best Interests of the Child?’ An Essay on Common 
Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence” (1997-1998) 31 Fam. L.Q. 551 at 567. 
57 Supra, note 55 at s. 18(2)(b).  The list includes factors such as: the child’s physical, psychological and emotional needs, 
the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, and any plans proposed for the child’s care 
and upbringing. 
58 Best Interests supra, note 56 at para. 18. 
59 Thomas R. Litwack, Gwendolyn L. Gerber and C. Abraham Fenster, “The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody 
Disputes” (1979-1980) 18 J. Fam. L. 269 at 271. 
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the best interests of the child going forward – to gather facts about the parent 
and child as they are today, and to make predictions about what will happen in 
the future.  The psychologist helps the court to filter out the dysfunctional 
background noise of a broken-down family and hone in on the true qualities of a 
parent that will affect his or her parenting going forward.60  Psychological 
evidence allows the court to bridge the gap between the ascertainable facts that 
can be established in a court (for example, that a parent behaved in a particular 
way), and the proper outcome given those facts and the ephemeral target of the 
“best interests” of the child.   
For example, in C(G) v. T.V-F61 the Supreme Court of Canada considered a 
custody dispute between the sister of the deceased mother of the children, and 
the children’s father.  The children had been in the sole custody of the mother; 
when she became terminally ill they went to live with their aunt.  Upon the 
mother’s death the father sought and was awarded sole custody in a habeas 
corpus proceeding.  However, the children repeatedly ran away to their aunt, and 
the aunt again sought custody.  A psychologist took these facts and from them 
drew a variety of conclusions about the best interests of the child, in particular 
related to the effect of the positive relationship between the aunt and the 
children’s deceased mother, and the dysfunctional relationship between the 
father and the deceased mother.  In her view the effect of these relationships 
was to fundamentally disrupt the ability of the children to thrive were they to be 
required to live with their father.  The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial 
judge’s award of custody to the aunt, and did so substantially on the basis of this 
evidence which they reproduced in significant part in the judgment.62 
Psychological evidence is a cornerstone of custody decision-making and is 
essential to the “best interests” test.  The use of psychological evidence is not 
just prolific in custody cases, but also fundamental to the structure and reasoning 
of the ultimate decision.  Even in decisions where the outcome seems to have 
largely flowed from other facts – where, for example, the parents had a three day 
armed stand-off police with their infant present63 – judges will use psychological 
evidence to legitimate their decision. 
2. Dangerous Offender Proceedings64 
Psychological evidence is even more entrenched in dangerous offender 
proceedings, so much so that this evidence is required by the Criminal Code. 65 
The necessity of psychological evidence in this context is great.  The rationale for 
                                         
60 For example, in Fraser v. Moreland [2006] NSJ No. 433 (NSCA), the father accused the mother of illegal drug use and 
the mother accused the father of sexually assaulting her and of physically abusing the children.  The father had two prior 
convictions for driving while impaired.  A psychologist report concluded that the mother was intelligent and that the 
children responded better to her, and that there was no evidence either of the mother’s drug use or of the father abusing 
the children.  The psychologist recommended that the mother be awarded custody.  Both the trial court and the appellate 
court followed this recommendation. 
61 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 244. 
62 Ibid.  at para. 6. 
63 Children’s Aid of Halifax v. C.V., [2005] N.S.J. No. 217 (NSCA).  
64 Canadian appellate dangerous offender cases from January 2006 to June 2008 were examined for this section of the 
paper. 
65 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 at ss. 752.1(1) and 753(1). 
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a dangerous offender designation is to prevent the reoccurrence of further 
criminal acts in the future and, thus, requires some type of forecasting that such 
criminal acts are or are not likely to occur.  Specifically, the Crown must prove 
two factors in a dangerous offender proceeding.66  The first is that the accused 
committed a serious personal injury offence, which does not require 
psychological evidence.  The second is that the accused has engaged in 
repetitive criminal behaviour due to an inability to restrain him or herself and this 
failure is likely to cause a future violent offence.  It is this second step that 
requires psychological evidence to establish this future likelihood.  To compound 
this prediction further, if these two criteria are met then the Court must exercise 
its discretion in assigning either a dangerous offender or long-term offender 
designation.  The difference between the two is the imposition of an 
indeterminate sentence, which is the result of a dangerous offender designation.  
Thus, to find that one is a dangerous offender, the Court must be satisfied that 
there is no reasonable possibility that the offender’s risk can be controlled by 
imposing a determinate long-term offender sentence.  Not only is psychological 
evidence tendered to predict whether generally there is a risk of re-offending, but 
also to specifically predict whether this risk will dissipate after the accused has 
been imprisoned.  Between these two requirements, the Court is quite 
demanding on its psychological experts. 
The way in which the court relies on psychological evidence in this context is 
uniform: they accept it.  The Court is reluctant to even critique psychological 
evidence offered unless there is a glaring error with an expert’s conclusions, for 
example the expert opines that the accused may be manageable under intense 
supervision, supervision which does not accord with the practical standards in 
reality.67  Predictions about the risk of future violence go essentially unchallenged 
by the Court.  There is so much reliance on expert evidence in this arena that 
there is some indication that the lines between the expert and the decision-maker 
have become blurred.  Experts in a few cases have felt comfortable crossing the 
evidentiary-legal line, giving not just behavioural predictions but also legal 
designation recommendations.68 
The Court’s dependence on psychological evidence in dangerous offender cases 
cannot be overstated.  A designation cannot be made without it; the Court is 
simply not in the position to make prediction of future violent behaviour on its 
own.  Psychological prediction evidence is foundational to dangerous offender 
proceedings. 
C. The Validity of Psychological Predictions 
To this point it is arguable that the reliance on psychological evidence in custody 
and dangerousness proceedings supports the use of psychological evidence in 
good character decisions. As noted, good character decisions, like custody and 
                                         
66 Ibid. at s. 753(1). 
67 R. v. Otto, [2006] S.J. No. 303 (CA) at para. 19 and R. v. Berikoff, [2007] B.C.J. No. 218 (CA) at para 16. 
68 R. v. F.E.D., [2007] O.J. No. 1278 at para. 25; R. v. Allen, [2007] O.J. No. 2226 at para. 30; R. v. Haug, [2008] S.J. No. 
100 at para. 118. 
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dangerousness, involve an existing set of facts and the need to make predictions 
about the future, in this case about greater likelihood of risks to the public should 
the person be admitted.  They also involve a standard – the nature of an 
applicant’s character and its relationship to public protection – that is essentially 
psychological in nature.69  The universal and significant reliance on psychological 
evidence in custody and dangerousness proceedings shows judicial acceptance 
of its validity and, given the similarity of the circumstances, provides prima facie 
support for its use here. 
The problem, however, is that there seems to be significant academic consensus 
that judicial confidence in the use of psychological evidence in these other 
contexts is not especially justified. Indeed, the empirical data and its academic 
analysis suggests that the psychological evidence relied upon by the courts is 
deeply suspect.  Despite its obvious relevance and apparent helpfulness to 
courts’ application of what are essentially psychological legal standards, 
psychological evidence doesn’t do what it is supposed to do: it does not reliably 
measure future dangerousness or future parenting.  This section reviews that 
academic literature. 
In determining whether psychological predictions are valid, it is necessary to 
understand how they are made.  In simple terms, future behaviour is a function of 
personality in situation.70  Obviously, however, even with only these two relevant 
variables making a prediction as to future conduct is difficult – there are 
interactions not only between personality and situation but also within personality 
traits and within situation traits.71  For example, one who possesses the 
personality traits of aggression and suggestibility may have a greater propensity 
for violence than would be expected from the presence of either trait separately.  
Likewise the presence of a threatening individual and a weapon may produce a 
greater likelihood of a violent response than if only a single variable is present.  
As people generally possess greater than two personality traits and can find 
themselves in a myriad of situations, the simple equation “personality x situation” 
grows exponentially more complicated. Reaching a specific prediction of specific 
behaviour, i.e. violence, is extremely difficult.   
In the criminal context there are two approaches used by psychologists to predict 
behaviour: clinical and actuarial.  Clinical prediction is simply a subjective 
decision made by a psychology professional after examining the subject and 
combining his or her characteristics in an intuitive way.72  There are no set 
factors that the professional must consider in every case, and in fact, the 
professional may not even be aware of factors he or she is relying on in reaching 
                                         
69 Or, at least, can only claim justification if it is. 
70 John Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior (Rockville ML: US Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1981) at 27. 
71 Ibid. at 28. 
72 John Monahan, “A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators and Patients” 
(2006) 92 Virginia L. R. 391 at 405; William M. Grove and Paul E. Meehl, “Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, 
Impressionist) and Formal (Mechanical, Alogrithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy” (1996) 2 
Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 293 at 293. 
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a conclusion. 73  More recently, actuarial prediction has gained much attention in 
the psychology community.  Actuarial prediction is a statistical method in which 
the psychology professional will record the subject’s characteristics and combine 
them in accordance with a set mathematical model.74  One author organizes the 
most commonly measured factors into four categories: what the person “is” (age, 
gender, race and personality), what the person “has” (mental disorder, substance 
abuse), what the person “has done” (prior crime and violence) and what has 
“been done” to the person (family environment and victimization).75   
There is significant empirical data with respect to the predictive accuracy of both 
clinical and actuarial approaches.  With respect to clinical predictions, two 
famous American studies provide a natural starting point for analysis.  In the 
1960s American dangerous offender laws changed as a result of court 
challenges.  The Baxstrom study arose from the transfer of almost 1,000 
dangerous offenders from hospitals for the criminally insane to civil mental 
hospitals in New York State after judicial invalidation of the prior approach. 76  
Because these dangerous offenders had been designated as such based on a 
positive prediction of future violence, the transfer provided the opportunity to test 
these predictions in the context of a civil facility.77  The results were remarkable.  
Despite the prediction of dangerousness for all Baxstrom patients, only 20% 
committed an assault78 during the fours years subsequent to the transfer.79  
Further, in that four-year period only 3% of these “dangerous offenders” were 
dangerous enough to be sent back to the hospital for the criminally insane.80  The 
Baxstrom study expanded in scope when 121 Baxstrom patients were 
additionally released from the civil hospital, allowing observation of these once 
labeled dangerous offenders in the community.81  In the two and a half years 
subsequent to their release only 9 of the 121 were convicted of a crime, and only 
one of those convictions was for a violent offence.82  This suggests that 120 of 
the 121 released offenders (99.2%) were labeled erroneously. 
Following the Baxstrom study, there was a second successful case in 
Pennsylvania, Dixon v. Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania,83 which spurred a replicate study.84  The results of this study were 
                                         
73 Joseph J. Cocozza and Henry J. Steadman, “Prediction in Psychiatry: An Example of Misplaced Confidence in Experts” 
(1977-1978) 25 Soc. Probs. 265 at 274. 
74 Monahan, supra note 72 at 405-406. 
75 Monahan, supra note 72 at 414 to 426. 
76 Baxstrom v. Herold. 383 U.S. 107, 1966.  Supra note 70 at 45-46. 
77 Ibid. at 46. 
78 Assault is not defined, but it appears from the context to refer to being charged (not actually being charged but the act 
would warrant a charge) with a criminal offence involving personal injury to another. 
79 Supra note 70 at 46. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 325 F. Supp. 966, 1971. 
84 Supra note 70 at 47 
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notably similar; only 14% of the patients initially thought to be dangerous 
engaged in “assaultive behaviour” in the four years subsequent to their release.85   
One further study followed 257 male felony defendants, 60% of whom were 
predicted to be dangerous.86  Both groups were hospitalized, the dangerous at a 
correctional hospital and the non-dangerous at a high-security civil facility.87  The 
authors note the conditions and treatment at the facilities were essentially 
identical, thus controlling for many variables that were not controlled in the earlier 
studies.88  The results of the study were surprising – there was no significant 
difference between the assaults committed by the dangerous and non-dangerous 
patients – dangerous offenders had only a marginally greater frequency of 
assaults, the difference being small enough to be explained as simply random 
variation. 89  Further, the study considered the occurrence of subsequent arrests 
upon release.  Fourteen percent of dangerous offenders and 16% of non-
dangerous offenders were rearrested for a violent offence.90 
Since these initial large and relatively dramatic studies, psychologists have only 
infrequently reconsidered the validity of clinical predictions, although a handful of 
studies have been conducted.91  One study assessed predictions of violence in 
emergency patients in a civil hospital.92  Subsequent violence was 
comprehensively evaluated; researchers incorporated novel data: self-reporting 
and community informants.93  This study concluded that 53% of those predicted 
to be “of concern” for future violence were violent  subsequently; 36% of those 
patients not of concern were violent subsequently.94  A second study focused on 
inpatient violence.  Nurses made an initial prediction as to whether they viewed a 
patient as of low, moderate or high risk for violence.  Ten percent of the low 
group, 24% of the moderate group and 40% of the high risk group committed 
violence.   
While these results clearly suggest greater predictive accuracy, they are far from 
reassuring.  In the first study the predictive accuracy is relatively close to random, 
to flipping a coin. 95  In the second study the accuracy was fairly high for patients 
viewed as of low risk of violence, but was wildly inaccurate – wrong 60% of the 
time – for patients predicted to be violent. 
                                         
85 Ibid.  Note that assaultive behaviour is not defined.  It appears, given the context, to, like assault, refer to conduct 
leading to a charge (see above) for a criminal offence involving personal injury to another. 
86 Supra note 73 at 267. 
87 Ibid. at 272. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. at 272-273. Note that this is a relatively small absolute difference, the results were not significantly different. 
91 John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence: The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and 
Actuarial Predictions of Violence, §7-2.1.1, in Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony 
(David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks and Joseph Sanders eds, 1997) at 308. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Assuming that the groups “of concern” and those not “of concern” had equal numbers, across the sample group as a 
whole the predictive accuracy was 44.5%. 
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The conclusion drawn from these studies – that clinical prediction is essentially 
impossible – has been subject to criticism.  It is argued, for example, that the 
problem is not clinical prediction per se; it is rather the institutional pressures 
created by dangerousness proceedings.  Because of those pressures the 
accuracy of prediction is being influenced by a bias on the part of the 
professional making the prediction. 96  Those professionals either intentionally 
over-predict to keep career criminals and chronic offenders institutionalized,97 or 
are reacting unconsciously to an incentive to over-predict.98 Intentional over-
prediction seems unlikely and difficult to prove; it is clear, however, that there is 
an incentive for over-prediction.  The repercussions of a false negative are 
severe.  If an individual predicted not to be dangerous commits a subsequent 
egregious violent crime, the result is a public outcry and questioning of the 
process by which this decision was made.99  On the other hand, if there is a trend 
toward over-prediction, there is no consequence for the predictor or for the 
judicial system, only for the person mis-identified and incarcerated.100  The 
substance of this critique, therefore, is that predictions of violence are not 
inaccurate, they are rather coloured by either a bias or an agenda on the part of 
the prediction-maker.   
The significance of this critique should not be overstated, however.  In almost 
every area of human endeavor these kinds of biases can arise – the possibility of 
true disinterest is unlikely.  In addition, and more importantly, the existence of 
assessor bias is unlikely to account for the sheer magnitude of the statistical 
unreliability of these assessments.  It may account for a certain amount of it, but 
it does not explain why the accuracy of predictions in some studies was shown to 
be little better than flipping a coin.  Finally, it certainly does not explain why in 
some studies the predictions of non-violent future behaviour were also incorrect – 
inaccurate by as much as 36%.101 
Others have suggested that the predictions at issue, particularly in the Baxstrom 
and Dixon studies, were out of date.  That is, the predictions were made at the 
time of incarceration and at that time the offenders were in fact dangerous. But, 
over the time spent institutionalized they have been treated and are now less 
dangerous such that the initial prediction is no longer accurate.102 In addition, by 
the time the studies were completed the offenders were older, and age 
notoriously decreases dangerous behaviour.103 The problem with these critiques, 
however, is that they essentially amount to an argument that as circumstances 
change predictions may become inaccurate.  But if the court is going to rely on 
predictions to keep a person indefinitely incarcerated the predictions have to be 
able to account for changing circumstances – the changing circumstances (such 
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as aging) explain why the prediction was inaccurate, they do not make it possible 
to predict accurately.  Also, the empirical claim of the first of these arguments is 
suspect, as the studies were not examining the initial prediction; the studies were 
examining the accuracy of the decision to keep the offender in the hospital.104 
Finally, it has been suggested that these prediction studies have underestimated 
the actual violence committed by those predicted to be dangerous offenders.  
Therefore, the apparent over-prediction of dangerousness is a function of later 
under-recording of violence not of prior over-estimation. 105  It is uncontroversial 
that there is some underestimation of violence, but the question is whether it is 
enough to invalidate or at least call into question the results of the above 
studies.106  This seems unlikely.  As noted earlier, in at least one of the more 
recent studies the researchers relied upon additional reporting measures, and 
the predictions were still inaccurate.107  In addition, there have been studies that 
have examined the extent of unreported violence.  One study examined a group 
of repeat offenders and found that for every arrest, the offender had committed 
seven unreported offences, a second study found a rate of ten felonies per 
arrest.108  Thus, the studies concluded that unreported violence is generally 
being committed by the same people – the ones eventually getting caught.  It 
follows then, that these studies do not refute the inaccuracy of prediction; rather 
they support the proposition that of the true dangerous offenders, some are more 
dangerous than others.  While it is true that studies will underestimate the actual 
amount of violence, it is unlikely that the underestimation is significant enough to 
correct for the inaccuracy of prediction.   
In sum, then, even with these critiques, the validity of clinical assessment of 
future behaviour is doubtful.  This is the case even where the behaviour in 
question is relatively extreme and also frequent, as it is for individuals designated 
as dangerous or likely to be violent. 
With respect to actuarial predictions, the general consensus appears to be far 
more positive.  One author summarizes three of the most notable actuarial 
models used for predicting violence, and reviews literature assessing the 
accuracy of each model.  Each model categorizes subjects into several risk 
categorizes ranging from low to high. The literature review indicated that for each 
model there was a considerable degree of accuracy.  Overall, where application 
of a model generated the lowest predicted likelihood of future violence, 1-11% of 
subjects were actually violent; where the application of a model generated the 
highest predicted likelihood of future violence 75-100% of the subjects were 
actually violent.109  
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A 1996 meta-analysis summarized the results of 136 studies of the relative 
accuracy of clinical and actuarial predictions.110  Of the 136 studies, 64 found 
actuarial methods to be significantly more accurate while only 8 preferred clinical 
predictions, with the remaining studies showing no significant difference between 
the two methods of prediction. 111 
Not surprisingly, there has been reluctance to adopt actuarial prediction 
techniques for use in the courtroom, despite their increased accuracy.  Use of 
actuarial methods is not always a practical possibility as there may be insufficient 
time or a situation may arise where an actuarial model does not exist.112  It is 
likely, for example, that no actuarial calculations could be done with respect to 
the relationship between past conduct by applicants for admission to the bar and 
future conduct as a lawyer.113 Further, actuarial methods are generally, not 
specifically, accurate; they cannot account for the rare event, a determinative 
factor in an individual case that is not included in the model.114  Any individual 
has the possibility to be the statistical outlier. There is some evidence of the use 
of actuarial models in recent Canadian dangerous offender appeals cases,115 but 
the vast majority of cases still rely exclusively on clinical predictions of violence. 
The results of the empirical studies testing the validity of predictions of violence 
are not particularly encouraging.  All studies report a significant rate of false 
positives, that is, labeling a person as dangerous when in fact he or she is not.  
To the extent that actuarial predictions improve the accuracy of predictions, their 
use is simply not reflected in actual legal decision-making.  While there are 
various complications in the data arising from, inter alia, assessor incentives and 
under-prediction of violence, none fundamentally undermine the conclusion that 
there is only modest support for the proposition that psychological experts can 
accurately predict future violence. 
Is the story any better in the custody context?  
Generally, predictions of the best interests of the child are determined in a similar 
fashion to predictions of violence.  Clinical predictions are simply the intuitive 
conclusion of an experienced professional as to what custody arrangement will 
be in the best interest of the child.  Actuarial models are also available for 
custody cases, but seem restricted to child protection cases where there are 
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allegations of abuse or neglect of a child.116  Only one of the Canadian custody 
cases examined employed actuarial assessments.117 
Predictions of the best interests of the child are also problematic.  Empirical 
studies examining the validity of predictions in this context are rare.  The studies 
that do exist validate predictions on the basis of the consensus of the 
professionals making a prediction. 118  No work has determined whether these 
predictions, even where a consensus exists, are correct in practice.119   
There exists one formidable obstacle preventing actual validation studies.  The 
best interest of a child is not a concrete, defined concept – there is no single 
variable that one can measure to determine the precision of a prediction.  If a 
study were to assess the success rate of these psychological predictions, what 
indicia would it consider: the child’s success in school, happiness, need for 
counseling?  The legal test poses this operational definition problem – there is no 
well-defined outcome.120  Thus the indeterminacy factor of the legal test is what 
creates the need for psychological evidence, but it is also what prevents any ex-
post assessment of its viability.121   
In the absence of these studies, most critics of psychological evidence in the 
custody context rely on analysis of predictions in a general sense, or rely on 
empirical data with respect to the accuracy of predictions of violence, to assert 
that predictions of behaviour relied on in custody decisions are simply not 
accurate.122  They supplement these findings with additional factors unique to 
child custody cases to argue that in this context predictions are even more 
fallible. Psychologists often make a prediction based on limited exposure to a 
parent occurring at a stressful time; the behaviour that is most influential in 
formulating a prediction may thus be highly atypical for the parent.123  
Additionally, the information received directly from parents or children may be 
biased.  All parties involved may feel compelled to tell the psychologist what they 
think he or she wants to hear, or what will advance each of their positions.124  
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Similarly, children are malleable and may be indirectly or directly influenced by 
their parents to speak or act in a certain way around the psychologist.125   
Some also argue that there is no way to predict long-term parenting ability and 
the effect of changes in parenting ability on children. 126  A parent’s ability to deal 
with a child may change throughout the course of the child’s development, and 
the skills a parent possesses may be more useful at certain times during a child’s 
life than others.  Thus, basing a prediction on the assumption that parents will 
continue to act and parent in the same way as they have in the past may be 
erroneous. 
The lack of studies assessing the accuracy of child custody predictions makes it 
difficult to draw any specific conclusion as to their validity.  The conceptual and 
practical limitations are such that this type of accuracy study will be rare.  Given 
that the predictions in this context are far more specific, in a sense, than 
predictions of violence (that is, the psychologist is seeking to predict one’s ability 
to deal with his or her own children as opposed to one’s functioning in the 
general community without resorting to violence), one might speculate that child 
custody predictions may be more accurate.  On the other hand, specific 
predictions may in fact be more difficult given the broad and general nature of 
psychology theory.127  This uncertainty has led some critics to conclude that 
psychological evidence in child custody cases should be limited to the more 
traditional role of assisting a judge in discovery, articulating, highlighting and 
analyzing the facts before him or her, and that any predictive function should be 
set aside.128 
There is thus good reason to doubt the reliability of psychological predictions as 
to future conduct, despite the widespread reliance on these predictions in 
custody and dangerousness decisions.  There is also reason for general concern 
with the incursion of expert evidence into judicial decision-making, general 
concern that exists whenever expert evidence is introduced, but which arguably 
compounds the accuracy problem. The concern arises from the fact that the 
judge is the competent authority in a legal sense – the person charged with 
deciding – but the expert’s knowledge in a particular area far outweighs the 
judge’s.  In particular, there exists the concern that there will be undue deference 
to the expert, given that it is the expert instructing the decision-maker on how to 
interpret the evidence.129  While this role-reversal alone is highly influential to the 
decision-maker, it can be especially problematic when there is much conflicting 
evidence and the expert evidence is given priority over the rest.  
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In addition, it is often difficult for decision-makers to discern whether expert 
evidence is reliable.130  The actual scientific problem is discussed above, but this 
is potentially compounded by issues with expert bias and the lack of consensus 
within a scientific community – a particularly common problem in psychology.131  
The problems with bias and consensus are exacerbated by the adversarial 
system – it is the parties selecting the experts.  Given the flexibility of 
psychological theories, it is very likely that both sides will have a psychology 
expert that supports their claim.132  This battle of the experts is troublesome 
when the decision-maker is unable to spot the weaknesses in the evidence, as it 
can lead to reliance on features such as the charisma or confidence of the expert 
testifying.133   
These evidentiary problems exist in every courtroom that deals with expert 
evidence, even in the case of hard science – where there are accepted and 
reliable scientific theories.  But in the case of predicting future behaviour, the 
problem becomes two-tiered: first, the scientific viability of the expert’s ability to 
make such a prediction is questionable; and second, the questionable evidence 
may not be used in a consistent and justifiable fashion once in the courtroom.   
The final section will consider the implications of this analysis for the good 
character requirement. 
IV. The Psychology of Good Character 
If law societies want to regulate admission on the basis of character they need to 
justify doing so; they need some reasoned argument as to why such regulation is 
legitimate.134 As argued above, it is difficult to see any basis on which a law 
society could justifiably regulate character as an ethical concept; there is no link 
between character in this sense and law societies’ legitimate objectives of 
protecting the public and maintaining ethical standards.135 If understood 
psychologically, as a set of personal dispositions that, in certain circumstances, 
lead to a greater likelihood of wrongful conduct, then regulation of character may 
be justifiable.  But then the question becomes, how is character in this sense 
established? How can a law society determine whether an applicant for 
admission has a personality trait that has manifested itself in circumstances 
sufficiently similar to legal practice to warrant the prediction that the individual 
poses a greater risk to the public should she be admitted to practice?   
At first blush psychological evidence seems to provide an answer to this problem.  
In both the custody and dangerousness contexts psychologists provide the court 
with exactly this type of analysis: based on the current information about a 
particular individual (or individuals) – his personality and how he has acted in 
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various circumstances – what is the likely outcome going forward?  If this 
evidence was reliable, its use in these contexts – the overwhelming recognition 
of its legitimacy by the judiciary – would be sufficient reason for its adoption in 
the context of character review, and would provide a modern justification for the 
retention of what is essentially a historical anachronism. 
The glaring problem, however, is that the usefulness of this evidence in those 
contexts is far from obvious. The academic consensus is that the predictions of 
future conduct based on clinical assessment relied on in making those decisions 
are largely inaccurate.   Moreover, it is quite possible that clinical assessment is 
even more likely to be inaccurate in the context of good character proceedings.  
In dangerousness cases the individuals in question have committed a serious 
personal injury offence and repeated criminal offences.  There is a pattern of 
behaviour that the psychologist can assess.136  In addition, there are actuarial 
models available that could at least confirm or qualify the clinical assessment 
with some degree of accuracy.  By contrast, in the context of good character the 
behaviour that gives rises to the inquiry is highly variable, there may be no 
repeated pattern of behaviour and, as noted, there is no actuarial model against 
which to judge the clinical assessment.   
In the custody contexts there may also be less situational variability to complicate 
the validity of the assessment. In the custody context you have circumstances 
which may change, but which at least have some relationship to each other: this 
parent parenting this child now and this parent parenting this child in the future.  
This may provide some reason to think, at least some of the time, that the 
predictions have merit.  In the good character context there may be little temporal 
or situational relationship between the pre-application conduct and the situation 
that the person will find herself in as a lawyer. 
With respect to the argument that there is some reason to use the evidence in 
good character hearings because of judicial recognition of its legitimacy 
elsewhere, it needs to be noted that courts making determinations on 
dangerousness or custody have little choice about whether to rely on 
psychological evidence. Once an individual has been incarcerated repeatedly for 
violent offences society has to make some determination about the 
consequences for that individual, and how to manage the future risk that he 
potentially presents.  And once parents separate, or once a parent has 
demonstrated an apparent incapacity to care for a child, some determination as 
to what should happen to that child needs to be made.  In making those arguably 
unavoidable decisions the legislature has articulated defensible legal standards 
on which to make them – prevention of future violence and protecting the best 
interests of the child.  It is the function of courts to apply those standards.  Thus 
judicial determination of the empirical foundation to which to apply those legal 
principles is almost impossibly difficult but is also inescapable; the decision has 
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to be made and the principles have to be applied. Whatever the flaws of 
psychological evidence, it is likely to assist a judge in making those 
determinations, and its use can be justified on that basis. 
This perspective was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Lyons,137 in which the Court considered the constitutionality of the 
dangerousness provisions.  Lyons argued that one of the problems with the 
provisions was the reliance on psychological evidence, given the essential 
invalidity of that evidence.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument.  It did not 
disagree that the evidence was problematic, but simply asserted that in a 
balance between a “risk of harm to innocent persons at the hands of an offender 
who is judged likely to inflict it,”138 and the rights of that offender, the weight 
should be placed on the rights of the innocent.  The fallibility of the evidence may 
warrant greater procedural protections, but did not invalidate the entire exercise.   
Can a similar argument be made about the good character requirement?  
Perhaps.  Arguably a law society faced with an applicant who has behaved badly 
has to make a decision about whether to admit that applicant.  Doing so on the 
basis of whether the applicant presents a risk to the protection of the public, or to 
the maintenance of high ethical standards is a legitimate legal principle to apply 
in making that admission decision.  Determining the empirical foundation against 
which to apply that principle involves a psychological question: given what this 
person has done – their personality traits, the circumstances of the prior conduct, 
and the circumstances of law practice – do they pose a greater risk to the public 
or to the profession’s ethical standards?  If they do, they should not be admitted.  
Since a law society is almost certainly ill-suited to make this determination, and 
could benefit from the assistance of psychological evidence, psychological 
evidence should be relied upon by law societies in making this decision.  Indeed, 
it is arguable that no law society should be making this kind of predictive 
psychological assessment without expert evidence.  Because to do so will lead 
inevitably to the subjective, applicant testimony driven decision-making which 
currently pervades the process, and leads (consequently) to unpredictable and 
arguably irrational decisions. 
On closer examination, however, this argument is problematic.  We agree that if 
law societies are going to continue to scrutinize applicant “character” they need 
to be more cognizant of the essentially psychological nature of the standard they 
are imposing, and be more rigorous in considering the application on that basis, 
including appropriate (i.e., critical) use of psychological evidence.  But this begs 
the question of whether the scrutiny of applicant character is warranted.  As 
noted, if the psychological evidence was first rate and reliable not much in the 
way of reasons would be needed to justify using it to assess applicant character.  
But the evidence isn’t first rate and reliable.  It is unreliable.  As such, it should 
only be used if there is little other option, if the decision has to be made and the 
evidence provides some grounds to assist the competent authority making it.  
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That is arguably the case for dangerousness and certainly the case for custody, 
but it is less obviously the case for character scrutiny.  The good character 
standard in Canada is not rigorously enforced.  Only a handful of applicants are 
denied admission in any given year, and some jurisdictions claim not to have 
denied admission to anyone in the past five years.139 If the good character 
requirement were to be eliminated tomorrow it would have little practical impact 
on the public at large.  This means that the retention of the requirement is best 
understood as optional, its elimination as of marginal significance. Given that, 
and given the impossibility of making psychological predictions with reliability, the 
inevitable conclusion appears to be that the requirement should not be retained. 
V. Conclusion 
After he was denied admission to the Law Society of Upper Canada, DMP 
committed suicide. While few individuals are denied admission on the basis of 
character, and as just noted the protection of the public that results from the 
application of the standard is minimal, it is important to be cognizant of the 
potential hardship for, and impact on, the individual who is denied admission.  
Such a decision should not be made lightly, and it should be made legitimately.   
The current approach to character screening in Canada is insufficiently rigorous.  
It incorporates too much of the historical concept of generic ethical character, 
and does not focus sufficiently on the character requirement’s purpose, the 
protection of the public.  The published decisions fundamentally duck the real 
issue: does this applicant present a greater risk to the public in the future, or not?  
In this paper we have explored whether shifting the character requirement 
unambiguously to the domain of psychological assessment would impose the 
necessary level of rigour.  In the abstract it might, and certainly if law societies 
insist on retaining character screening there seems little justification for doing so 
other than on the basis of some assessment of the applicant’s future conduct in 
law.  In practice, however, it appears doubtful whether this approach would serve 
any useful purpose, and it has the potential to be quite unfair.  Such predictions 
cannot be made with any accuracy on an individual basis.  As a consequence, it 
is as likely as not that any given denial of admission will be unjust.  If that is the 
case, then the good character requirement should be abandoned. 
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